University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 7
Issue 2 Winter 2010
2010

Further Reflections on Not Being "Not an
Originalist"
H. Jefferson Powell

Bluebook Citation
H. Jefferson Powell, Response, Further Reflections on Not Being Not an Originalist, 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 288 (2010).

This Response is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more
information, please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.

Article 4

100524 Powell Response Ready for Proofs updated 2 (Marty)

10/2/2011 9:11 PM

ARTICLE

FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON NOT BEING
“NOT AN ORIGINALIST”
H. JEFFERSON POWELL
There are two issues on which I have come to a clearer view of my own
position, benefitted by the very thoughtful responses by Professors Michael
Stokes Paulsen and Robert J. Delahunty, the ensuing general discussion,
and subsequent conversations with others. 1 I have not been persuaded—as
yet!—that I am mistaken in my overall argument, but perhaps this
supplementary essay will indicate more clearly than I was initially able to
do what the basic questions are, and how I (and those who disagree with me
as well) might best answer them.
(1) Objection: The problem to which originalism is the proposed
solution is non-existent, and thus one ought to be “not an originalist.”
My response is that originalism stemmed from the correct perception
that (a) the Supreme Court was systematically failing to make
constitutional decisions in a professionally responsible fashion, and (b)
the Court has an obligation to make its decisions in that manner.
Contrary to the anti-originalists, then, originalism identified an
important problem. However, (c), the originalists’ own formulation of
their critique suffers from an internal contradiction.
A great many lawyers and others interested in constitutional issues
dismiss originalism because in their view it was, and is, an unnecessary
response to a feature of recent constitutional law that is neither novel nor
troubling. 2 I have argued that the initial and ongoing impetus for
1. In particular, I should mention Ralf Michaels, Sarah Powell, and James Boyd White.
2. Actually, some people who reject originalism go much further than that, and think the
originalist project an intellectually dishonest pseudo-answer to a contrived pseudo-problem. That
there have been people who endorsed originalism, or opposed it, for insincere or strategic reasons,
I do not doubt, but the ever-present possibility of hypocrisy is simply one of the moral
circumstances of all intellectual debate. What one should do about it, if anything, in this or other
contexts is a distinct question from a debate on the merits. My interest, in the lecture and this
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originalism has been the strong sense that something was, and is, seriously
awry with the Supreme Court’s execution of its task of constitutional
adjudication and exposition.
For many anti-originalists (let’s call them), there was nothing wrong in
principle with the ways in which constitutional law developed in the period
from the appointment of Earl Warren to the appointment of William
Rehnquist as Chief Justice. On this view, while there were individual
constitutional decisions that were wrong (perhaps many such decisions) and
the Court at times drove some way down a path of analysis that turned out
to lead to a dead end,3 such occasions were of no broad significance. The
Court, they reason, has always made constitutional decisions in ways
similar to those that provoked the sharp attacks launched against Chief
Justices Warren and Burger and their colleagues. It is a consistent and no
doubt irremediable characteristic of constitutional law that, at times, the
Court makes mistakes, a failing from which the Warren and Burger Courts
were not exempt, but their occasional lapses provide no justification for a
general objection to their work product based on the claim, or fear, that
their errors were unusual or systemic.
I have considerable sympathy with this, the apologist’s perspective: as I
noted in my lecture, I think much of the constitutional law the Warren
Court made was well made. 4 Nevertheless, I think the systemic criticism
that motivates originalism is so substantially justified that I side with the
critics rather than the apologists.
Consider Charles Fried’s version of the broad critique (I do not suggest
that Professor Fried is an originalist himself). “[I]t was not the so-called
activism” that was the Warren Court’s perceived sin, Fried has suggested,
“but the suspected lack of professional discipline and principle.”5
[T]he Court was not only willing to strike out clearly and boldly for
some great principle of liberty, as in Brown v. Board of Education

essay, is in addressing others who share my concern on the merits with the questions of how we
should do constitutional law, and whether originalism is a cogent answer.
3. A good example might be the Court’s brief flirtation with a special constitutional doctrine
addressing irrebuttable presumptions. Compare Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973)
(holding that “permanent irrebuttable presumptions” presumptively violate due process) with
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 770–72 (1975) (effectively abandoning the doctrine). Most
observers then and since have thought the Court’s retreat in Weinberger was wise.
4. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L.
REV. 3, 3–16 (1970), reprinted in CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 140–55
(1986) (evaluating the Warren Court’s constitutional decisions). Professor Black’s laudatory
conclusions rested not simply on his moral and political approval of the major themes in the
Warren Court’s constitutional jurisprudence but also on his judgment that the work of the Warren
era, taken as a whole, was “good law” in which “reason support[ed] justice” and thus satisfied the
demands of what Black called “the art of law.” Id. at 14–16; see also BLACK, supra, at 26
(“responsibility to reason, even to technical reason, is the soul of the art of law”).
5. Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 75 (1995).
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or perhaps Reynolds v. Sims, but also [seemed to be] implementing
a diffuse and omnivorous project to further a partisan agenda in
every field it touched. Carrying out this project, the Court was
unwilling to be held back even by the need to offer good reasons
for what it was doing, to state the facts, to distinguish the
precedents, to parse the statutes in a professionally responsible
way. 6
The Burger Court, Fried thinks, “offered no relief at all” from these
faults. 7
On the contrary, it piled incoherence on incoherence. It neither
carried forward and rationalized the left-liberal thrust of the Warren
Court nor resolutely dismantled it. . . . [Many of its] decisions,
although in practical terms significant, were so cryptic, so redolent
of compromise, or so incoherent in statement, that they convinced
no one and settled nothing. 8
This all seems to me admirably and accurately put, but I expect that
many eminent and highly intelligent anti-originalist commentators would
reject it as essentially wrong-headed because it rests on a faulty premise. It
makes sense to label a discernible substantive thrust to the Court’s decisions
a partisan agenda, pillory its opinions as professionally irresponsible, or
ridicule a period of ad hoc outcomes as incoherent only if there is some
standard of behavior or performance by which to judge non-partisanship,
professionalism, and coherence. Such a standard exists only if there is a
persuasive argument, not only that the Court can live up to the standard
proposed, but also that the Court is under a definable obligation to do so. It
is precisely the existence of any such standard that is doubted by many antioriginalists.
This skepticism about the presuppositions of Fried’s (or my, or the
originalists’) critique is not an attribute shared only by Warren and Burger
Court apologists. A few years ago, I heard an academic lawyer—a most
distinguished person—comment that “the law, of course, has no method of
its own.” This was said with the air of one making an observation so
obviously true as to need neither explanation nor justification. I believe that
this is a view shared very widely in the legal academy and, perhaps less
self-consciously, among more than a few practicing lawyers and judges.
If the law has no method and, as I took the person I am quoting to
mean, important or controversial legal decisions must or should be reached
6. Id. at 75–76. In form, Professor Fried is stating what he believes “the country” thought to
be true about the Warren Court, but I think the judgments are clearly his as well. Id. at 75. I do not
believe that Fried is charging the Warren era justices, or most of them, with being intentionally
partisan (or the justices of the Burger era with being knowing incompetents!).
7. Id. at 76.
8. Id.
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on the basis of considerations with no intrinsic relationship to legal
reasoning or argument, 9 it makes no sense to criticize the justices’
constitutional decisions for their professional deficiencies. Professionalism
involves, at most, a set of conventions about the verbal forms in which the
Court’s constitutional decisions should be announced. The justices must
make the decisions themselves on other grounds of policy, political
expediency, or morality. An anti-originalist holding this view thus would
have a good reason for criticizing Warren Court liberalism if she thought a
conservative slant would have been preferable, or even Burger Court
incoherence if she thought that era’s inconsistencies had been harmful.
Such criticisms, however, rest on different grounds than the critique of the
Court that lies at the root of originalism, and that Professor Fried and I
share in substantial measure.
To sustain this latter form of critique, one must, in principle, be ready,
as I have suggested, to state an account of constitutional law that is a
realistic description of what the Supreme Court could be imagined doing
when it decides constitutional cases, and an explanation of why the Court
might be thought to have an obligation to make decisions in the described
fashion. This account and explanation clearly require a fuller statement than
I can provide in these reflections (or perhaps at all!), but let me indicate
what I would give as the basic lines of argument.
(a) The concept of a professionally responsible constitutional decision.
First, constitutional law is, or should be, law—not just as a matter of the
verbal forms in which decisions are clothed but in the decisional process
itself. How we ought to think of law itself is, to be sure, hotly debated: one
need only think of Hart versus Fuller or, coming closer to today, Dworkin
versus all his critics (including Dworkin versus Hart! 10). I don’t think we
need to settle or even address those debates to give some meaning to the
assertion that constitutional law ought to be law.
Legal reasoning and argument, in this legal culture, have certain
features, regardless of the specific jurisprudential theories (or instincts) of
the lawyers who employ them, that render law a unique form of social
decision making. 11 Legal reasoning is centrally “characterized by authority9. There might be good reasons for someone who thinks this way to accept formalistic
legalism as an appropriate means for resolving controversies that are unimportant, or unimportant
to anyone but individual litigants. If no one else cares whether John or Mary inherits Blackacre,
and there is a formalistic argument that Mary should have it, one might as well let Mary do so.
Even there, note, the actual reason Mary wins is not because her victory proceeds from the
authority of the law but because running the formalistic calculus is efficient or for some other
extra-legal reason.
10. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 140–86 (2006).
11. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, at xii, 11 (2009) (“[T]here
is, descriptively, something we can accurately characterize as ‘thinking like a lawyer,’” and “those
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based reasoning—taking the source of a directive rather than the reasons
behind it as a justification for following it,” 12 and by the particular regard
legal reasoners give to both authoritative texts and judicial decisions (many
of the latter, of course, being themselves interpretations or applications of
such a text). 13 Legal decisions thus differ sharply from those reached in
other settings, where the decision maker’s own individual and substantive
views on what it is wisest or best to do are typically decisive: “only rarely
do judges engage in the kind of all-things-considered decision-making that
is so pervasive outside of the legal system.” 14 Excellence in making legal
decisions depends on the exercise of a particular “social capacity: the ability
to reason from a body of shared experiences with normative significance to
solutions for new practical problems.” 15
Constitutional-law decision making is decision making of this
particular, legal variety, characterized by the axiomatic authority of the
text, 16 the defeasible but weighty claims to authority of judicial precedent,
and the argument over the meaning of text and precedent that is couched in
the familiar modalities of the common law and subjected to the test of legal
debate and deliberation.17 This is in fact what constitutional law has been,
as a descriptive matter, since Americans first began dealing with the
existence of written constitutions that claim their authority directly from the
notional sovereign, and thus can be law for the government and not just law
for the governed.
Since the Constitution was a written law, it had to be construed, and
this was to be done according to the prevailing methods of legal
construction. The ways in which Americans interpret the
Constitution could have been different; indeed the forms of

aspects of legal reasoning that are somewhat formal” are critical parts of “law’s unique
contribution to social decision-making.”); DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 186 (“Don’t tell the judges
that they should exercise their discretion as they think best. They want to know how to understand
the [Human Rights] Act as law, how to decide, and from what record, how freedom and equality
have now been made not just political ideals but legal rights.”). Dworkin had in mind, I suppose,
the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998, but he might equally have been talking about the U.S.
Constitution. My assertions about the identifying characteristics of law are concerned, it is perhaps
needless to say, with American law, as a particular variant in the broader common law tradition.
12. SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 6.
13. See id. at 44 (“[F]ollowing the past without regard to its rightness is pivotal to how law
operates.”).
14. Id. at 67.
15. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD UNIV.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 9 (2003).
16. To say that the text has axiomatic authority is not to say that textual arguments always
do, or always should prevail. There is more to constitutional law than argument over the
Constitution’s words. The words, however, are always relevant and, I would think, presumptively
decisive.
17. The traditional common-law understanding of reason put great weight on accountability
to “the public forum of forensic deliberation and argument.” See Postema, supra note 15, at 7–11.

100524 Powell Response Ready for Proofs updated 2 (Marty)

2010]

FURTHER REFLECTIONS

10/2/2011 9:11 PM

293

constitutional discourse are very different in other societies. For
Americans, however, these ways have taken the forms of common
law argument, those forms prevailing at the time of the drafting and
ratification of the US Constitution. Thus the methods hitherto used
to construe deeds and wills and contracts and promissory notes,
methods confined to the mundane subjects of the common law,
became the methods of constitutional construction once the state
itself was put under law. 18
To say that constitutional law ought to be law is to say that
constitutional decisions, if they are to be constitutional decisions in this
society, interpreting this Constitution, are to be debated and justified
through the authority-based reasoning and the forms of common law
argument that are the identifying characteristics of law in this society. It is
to reject the view, for example, that a constitutional decision should be
whatever the decision maker thinks would be the wisest or most desirable
decision for society—”what should be done, all things considered”—as
opposed to what the Constitution’s text, and the relevant constitutional
precedents and practice, might be thought to command. 19
This account of what law, and thus constitutional law, ought to be is of
course overtly normative as well as descriptive. An argument does not
become law in the sense I mean simply by using legal terms or citing cases.
In my lecture, I quoted Professor John Hart Ely’s famous comment that the
Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade was “bad . . . because it is not constitutional
law” (legal terminology and citations notwithstanding), although perhaps it
would be better to say, as Ely first suggested, that the mere piling up of the
forms of legal talk can amount to law, though if that is all there is to it what
one has is an example of “bad law.” 20
However we choose to frame our judgments, the account of law I am
proffering is prescriptive. Ely’s criticism of the Roe opinion was not that it
failed some definition of literary genre but that its use of law-talk seemed to
him almost wholly disconnected from the decision the Court was
announcing or the Court’s reasons for reaching that decision: the Court
showed “almost no sense” that the justices had felt obliged to reason, as
opposed to talk, in legal terms. The cogency of Ely’s criticism can be seen
in the almost complete absence of any attempt to defend the opinion of the
Court on the part of the many lawyers and scholars who think the decision
correct. There is, in effect, a consensus on the judgment that the opinion
was a failure, unpersuasive, and unprofessional, which demonstrates the
normative function of the common-law description of law generally shared
18. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
19. SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 76.
20. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 947 (1973).
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by American lawyers. 21
This then is the standard of evaluation and critique that Professor Fried
and I (and, with a reservation to be noted, the original originalists) would
apply to the Supreme Court of the Warren and Burger eras, or any other.
The justices’—or anyone else’s—handiwork in constitutional cases should
be held to the standards of professionalism, responsibility, intellectual
coherence, and intellectual honesty that have applied to the decisions of
courts in the common-law tradition on “the mundane subjects” of the law,
which include, of course, statutory construction as well as common law in
the narrower sense:
[E]ven in constitutional cases, precedent and analogy are the stuff
of legal argument and . . . legal argument is what moves the
Court—or moves it when all involved are doing their work right.
Certainly the Justices sometimes ignore or run over or through the
arguments, but when this happens it is felt as unfair and wrong.
And judges too must feel that precedent and analogy are the straw
out of which their bricks are made. A brief to the Court is largely
analogy and precedent. . . . This has been the texture of common
lawyers’ reasoning for centuries. 22
There are, of course, intramural debates over how to define a “good”—
professional, responsible, intellectually honest—opinion or series of
opinions in the common-law tradition, but these debates are, I believe,
exactly the sort of debates one would expect to find in a living intellectual
tradition. 23 Their existence does not preclude the existence of substantial
degrees of agreement over whether a given decision is well reasoned, or a
given judge or advocate professionally admirable. Most constitutional
lawyers respect the second Justice Harlan as an exemplary constitutional
judge even if they disagree very strongly with his conclusions on some or
even many issues, and I need not name names to remind most readers that
parallel but negative judgments are widely shared with respect to some
other justices of the recent past.
Let me briefly note a potential objection to this statement of the

21. I think that any such description is inherently normative, but for present purposes nothing
rides on this further claim.
22. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 66 (1991); see also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION 44 (2010) (“The common law approach [to constitutional law] is what we actually
do.”).
23. The reader will observe, no doubt, the pervasive influence of Karl Llewellyn. See KARL
N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). I believe that
William Twining is persuasive in identifying Llewellyn’s concern with professionalism and
tradition in that great book as of a piece with his earlier, Legal Realist-era work on juristic method
rather than as a late-in-life retreat from the critical insights of Realism. See WILLIAM TWINING,
Karl Llewellyn’s Unfinished Agenda: Law in Society and the Job of Juristic Method, in THE
GREAT JURISTIC BAZAAR: JURISTS’ TEXTS AND LAWYERS’ STORIES 149–200 (2002).
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standard of “good” constitutional law decision making to which I am
proposing the Court can be held. 24 I suggest we put to one side the general,
jurisprudential question about the extent to which some of the Legal
Realists were right to see non-legal factors as the crucial determinants of
legal decisions in all circumstances. If that view is correct, then the antioriginalists might be right to reject the critique of the Warren and Burger
Courts that I accept, but at the risk of giving up on law more generally. This
hyper-Realist position is not a tenable one, I believe, 25 but, in any event, the
anti-originalists can make their case with a narrower and arguably more
plausible argument: that constitutional decision making by the Supreme
Court of the United States in general has not and will not conform to the
account of law I am putting forward whatever may be the truth about law in
other venues. 26 Consider empirical research into the role of ideology in
controversial Supreme Court decisions, the attitudinal model of judicial
decision making, and even the ease with which journalists and bloggers can
sort justices into “liberal” and “conservative” camps—does not everything
point to the conclusion that the Court is and has always been political in a
sense not admitted or acceptable under the traditional understanding of law?
Is not the idea that “legal argument is what moves the Court” an exploded
superstition, a self-delusion or (at best—or is it at worst?) a fiction?
The answer to these questions is, I think, no, for several reasons that I
shall list rather than prove: (1) the increasingly sophisticated and interesting
empirical study of the Court’s work is leading, unexpectedly from some
perspectives, to a more complicated picture of what seems to account for
the Court’s constitutional decision making rather than to the complete
triumph of the attitudinal model: “the justices just vote whatever they want”
is likely to prove almost as crude and inexact a description as “the justices
rigidly follow an entirely determinate, external set of legal rules”; 27 (2)
24. I will deal with a second objection (or misunderstanding) more briefly. I do not think that
judicial opinions are supposed to be records of how the judge came to her conclusions, and a
commitment to what I am calling the traditional understanding of law is fully consistent with
seeing the function of the opinion, particularly on contentious or difficult issues, as an explanation
of how the decision is coherent with the law as a whole that is after-the-fact with regard to the
judge’s initial sense of what the decision should be.
25. For my reasons, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Humanity of Law, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010).
26. On the plausibility of the hyper-Realist viewpoint in general, and especially with respect
to the Supreme Court, see the discussion (with which I agree) in SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 138–
42.
27. See, e.g., Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009) (criticizing not only the “legal”
but also the “political” model of Supreme Court decisionmaking and presenting support for a
model in which decisions are driven largely by the justices’ responses to macroeconomic issues).
The important, broad-ranging symposium of which this article is a part generally supports the
proposition that it is an error to think that the empiricists have “proven” the hyper-Realist position.
See generally Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. Williams, Foreword: Measuring Judges and
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leading students of the judicial process who subscribe to models of that
process stressing the role of extra-legal factors recognize the salience of
formal legal reasoning; 28 and (3) most importantly, as I pointed out in my
lecture, since John Marshall, sophisticated constitutional lawyers have
recognized the enormous role that moral and political considerations play in
the resolution of difficult constitutional issues. The traditional
understanding of law, and more specifically of constitutional law, is entirely
consistent with acknowledging the inescapable presence of politics and
morality, even if some formulations of that understanding, particularly of
late by its critics, are not. One can argue, of course, that the whole tradition
has been one of continuous self-deceit or mauvais foi, but, like all global
cynicisms, this contention is ultimately unanswerable and, I think,
deserving of no answer.
(b)

The Court’s obligation to make
constitutional decisions.

professionally

responsible

So much then for the standard to which I think the Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions can and should be held. But why should the
justices, or anyone else, think them obliged to pay it heed, even granting
arguendo that they could? The Constitution is a matter of life and death
(sometimes literally); it concerns power and the limits of power, justice,
Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173 (2009) (introducing the symposium’s themes and conclusions).
Compare Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMENTARY 461, 462 (2009) (“Ironically, political science scholarship is now moving away
from attitudinalism—as usual, law professors are ten or twenty years behind the discipline from
which they are borrowing ideas.”) with Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (And Does it Matter), 26
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 97, 105 n.25 (2009) (“The attidudinalist [sic] model is still the
prevailing model in political science, if we count strategic models of judging as a more nuanced
subset of attitudinalism.”).
28. I have in mind, above all, Judge Richard A. Posner, who is certainly one of the leading
critics of anything resembling legal formalism to be found within the legal profession, but whose
overall perspective is more difficult to characterize than his own language often suggests.
Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 145 (2001) (characterizing the issues in Bush v. Gore as calling
for “legal-type judgments rather than for raw exercises of political power . . . a process of
statutory (and constitutional) interpretation and application, the sort of thing that courts are
equipped to do”) with id. at 208 (characterizing the Constitution as “invit[ing], enabl[ing], and
even compel[ling] the Justices to base many of their constitutional decisions on contestable
personal values and ideological preferences” and constitutional law as “[a]n incoherent, deeply
politicized body of case law”). Posner’s recent analysis of judicial decisionmaking starkly
concludes that the Supreme Court “is inescapably a political court when it is deciding
constitutional cases.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 323 (2008). Posner’s explanation
of what he means by “political” in the context of discussing judicial decisions, however, is
considerably more nuanced than the word itself might lead a reader to expect. See, e.g., id. at 13,
73, 94–95 (discussing what he means by the term), and id. at 253 (stating that “[t]he pragmatic
judge must play by the rules of the judicial game, just like other judges” in referring to Bush v.
Gore); see also SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 67 n.19 (noting that Posner “accept[s] the largely
authority-based nature of legal reasoning”).
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equality, and liberty—the greatest of human social questions. It is by no
means idle to wonder why the folkways of common lawyers should play
any significant role in resolving the controversies over these questions that
inevitably arise.
The negative conclusion that it is idle or foolish to think that lawyers’
thinking should play such a role can be put in a couple of different ways.
For many people, running constitutional decisions through the gauntlet of
lawyers’ reasoning amounts to moral cowardice or indifference. Why
should someone possessed of the enormous power to do good or ill that
belongs to the Court’s members in their exercise of judicial review
willingly circumscribe that power, or permit its direction toward evil ends,
simply because of arguments that arise out of an elitist, hot-house,
professionally self-congratulatory rhetoric? Someone who sees the good
and has the power to do it, and who fails to do so on such a ground is,
surely, a moral reprobate.
For other people, the problem with allowing legal reasoning to
constrain constitutional choice is that doing so is mindless, a kind of
intellectual superstition. The Court’s purpose in deciding the sort of bigticket issues that come before it with a constitutional label ought to be to
achieve the best social outcomes (the most efficient, the most-widely
accepted, etc.). Objections that the Constitution doesn’t allow for those
outcomes for legal reasons ignore the fact that “the Constitution” has a
malleable wax nose. It would be “legalistic,” or a lapse into sheer
“formalism,” to stop short of the outcome with the highest utility value
because of lawyers’ talk about what constitutional law requires or prohibits.
These would-be realists (they often call themselves pragmatists) usually
look down on the moral enthusiasts of the first group, but they share with
the enthusiasts a profound scorn for the law as a discursive practice. They
are both, in their very different ways, supporters of King James I and
“natural reason” in his struggle against Lord Coke’s exaltation of the
“artificial reason” of the law and the lawyers.
The “natural reason” objection to bringing constitutional decision
making under the traditional standard of law is hardly an idle one, and there
are distinguished persons who advocate or act on one version or the other of
it. It is, however, quite wrong, in my judgment, and the Court is under an
obligation to make constitutional decisions in accordance with the
traditional, common law standard. A systemic failure to follow that
standard—what the first originalists feared or accused the Court of doing—
thus would undercut the legitimacy of the Court. The Court’s obligation to
do law (as we might put it) stems from three sources.
First, what the Supreme Court has always claimed to be doing when it
decides constitutional cases is deciding them in accordance with the
traditional account of law that I have just sketched. The justices have never
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laid claim to the power to impose their views of what is just (or moral or
efficient or desirable) unfettered by the demands of legal reasoning. The
social practice in the United States by which we resolve controversies over
a wide range of political issues by subjecting them to decision by the Court
(and indeed leaving the question of which issues will be so resolved up to
the Court) incorporates as one of its features that the Court makes its
decisions as decisions of law, explained and applied as law, and, in
situations that are amenable to formulation as cases in law.
There are certainly other ways to imagine handling the societal
necessity of resolving such controversies, including by leaving them to an
institution much like our high Court, yet charged with making decisions
based on what would be best, all things considered, 29 but that is not our
system. Chief Justice Hughes did indeed write, extra-judicially and much to
his later regret, that “the Constitution is what the judges say it is,” but what
he meant was essentially 180 degrees from the “natural reason” position.
Precisely because one’s views on great constitutional questions are heavily
influenced by his “wishes, affections, and general theories,” 30 Hughes
thought it essential for the justices to bring their individual intuitions and
preferences on constitutional matters to the bar of legal analysis because
their role is the specifically legal (or better, lawyers’) job of deciding cases
according to law. Latter-day King Jameses, whether enthusiasts or realists,
are proposing that the Supreme Court stop doing what it has always said it
is doing, and do something else. Constitutional law, however, must be law
because that is, as a matter of social practice and definition, just what it is.
But why should not the Court do exactly that—change the rules of the
game from abiding (or pretending to abide) by an immoral or mindless
legalism to a robust matter of doing whatever is right? Constitutional
history is replete with change, sometimes momentous, ordained or heralded
by the Court; why not here, with respect to the Court’s own role? Indeed, is
not the progress of the Court from a very secondary role to center stage in
American public life an example of the Court transforming its own role?
In his commentary on my lecture, Professor Delahunty rightly pressed
this issue of change, 31 and I think his point an important one: one recalls,
with a sense of astonishment, that John Jay declined reappointment as Chief
Justice because the Court’s role in national life was too trivial. Nonetheless,
I believe that it does not lie within the Court’s rightful authority to put aside
29. The council of revision that Madison among others hoped to make a part of the federal
government would have been somewhat along these lines.
30. 4 JOHN MARSHALL, LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 243 (Chelsea House 1983) (1805).
31. See Robert J. Delahunty, Originalism and Legitimacy: A Reply to Professor Powell, 7 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 281, 285 (“[t]he role of constitutional review in American public life has surely
become far more pervasive than it was at the beginning of the Republic . . . . I think that Professor
Powell’s emphasis on the continuities of the American constitutional tradition tends to discount
the importance of this vast expansion of the judicial role.”).

100524 Powell Response Ready for Proofs updated 2 (Marty)

2010]

FURTHER REFLECTIONS

10/2/2011 9:11 PM

299

legal reasoning as the matrix for its constitutional decision, and still less is
it proper for an individual justice to do so on his or her own. The justices
are public servants, bearers of a public trust. Their authority is not inherent
in them as individuals, or unlimited by the position to which they have been
appointed, but stems entirely from their good-faith execution of the
particular task that is theirs. This is a political and moral obligation, as well
as a legal one signified by their oath of office.
Just to observe this is not, of course, to say what it is they have a
political and moral obligation to do, but as to that there can be, I think, only
one plausible answer. As their job is a public and societal one, so its
definition is public and societal—the Court is a court of law and its
members are judges whose authority begins and ends with decision
according to law. For the justices to announce that they are henceforth
going to do something else would be a violation of their oaths and grounds
for impeachment.
Our latter-day King Jameses silently concede the force of this argument
by their failure to counsel the Court to announce publicly that it decides
constitutional cases on extra-legal grounds, as a council of enthusiasts or
realists. The justices themselves acknowledge the obligation by their
unfailing attempt to explain their decisions in legal terms. Advice that they
should do otherwise without disclosing the fact is, however well intended, a
species of subornation that, if heeded, leads to a fraud on the Republic.
This then is the second source of the Court’s obligation to abide by the
standard of traditional legal argument in making constitutional decisions:
the personal obligation of the Court’s members to carry out, in good faith,
the duties of the office they hold as the society that empowers them
understands both duties and office, and as they themselves acknowledge by
the forms in which they announce and justify their decisions. As long as
that understanding holds, society is entitled to rely on the justices’ sworn
commitment to act in accordance with it. 32

32. The question of what American society thinks the Court does and ought to do is
ultimately empirical. There is significant evidence supporting what I would suppose that most of
us would assume is true, that the public believes that the Court ought to “follow the law” in its
decisions although it often suspects the justices of being too “political.” See, e.g., Doni
Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of
Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897 (2005); John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial
Behavior and Public Opinion: Public Expectations Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme
Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181 (2001); John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of
Legality and Public Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928 (2000). I do not
suggest, of course, that the public at large understands, or thinks it understands, traditional legal
reasoning in any depth or detail. This raises interesting questions about the viability of currently
fashionable notions of popular constitutionalism, see Gewirtzman, supra, at 924–27, but I do not
think it poses a serious problem of legitimacy for the traditional understanding of law. The public
at large (the present writer emphatically included) has no deep understanding of pharmaceutical
chemistry but generally acts—I think rationally—in reliance on the doctors, the chemists, and the
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Jefferson wrote that, while a “strict observance of the written laws is
doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen,” it is nonetheless “not the
highest,” and Lincoln echoed him when he asked whether “all the laws, but
one, [are] to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces, lest that
one be violated.” 33 In light of the changes in the Court’s role in American
life that Professor Delahunty underlined, perhaps it is time to push society
to reconsider how it expects the Court to make decisions. Perhaps the
traditional understanding of legal argument is too narrow to account for the
Court’s necessary and desirable role, or to permit the justices to reach just
resolutions in the controversies they address without intellectual dishonesty
or distortion due to the limitations of legal process. The lesson of history,
one might add, is that the Court has, at times, significantly reshaped
society’s expectations about the constitutional system in ways that have
come to seem, at least in retrospect, entirely legitimate exercises of its
authority. 34
The reader already knows that I reject as indefensible the suggestion
that individual justices should undertake, unannounced, such a radical
change in the terms of their performance, but I reject as well the argument
that they should do so openly in a bid for public agreement that, as a
general matter, the Court no longer should approach constitutional issues as
questions of law. My reason stems from the third source of the Court’s
obligation to do law in constitutional cases: the social value of the Court
doing so.
Consider for a moment the proposition that the Court should reach the
best result for society in every constitutional case that it decides without
regard to whether that result can be justified in traditional legal terms.
Leave aside the important, and sometimes unknowable, factual concern
about what the consequences of a given decision will actually be. If you are
FDA. Elitism is an empty accusation when there are good reasons for relying on an “elite” defined
by actual expertise. Critics of traditional legal reasoning, to be sure, often deny the existence of
those reasons and expertise with respect to the law, but that is in the end simply another way to
restate the hyper-Realist view of law.
33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 127 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis omitted); Abraham
Lincoln, Message to Congress in a Special Session (July 4, 1861) in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis omitted).
34. Brown v. Board of Education is the most obvious candidate but there are no doubt others.
I think, for example, that many of the hotly-criticized Warren Court criminal procedure decisions
were rightly decided and that they played a highly important role in changing social expectations
about police behavior, not least among police officers themselves. We need not pause to review
the debate about the actual impact of the Court’s decisions on public opinion since I am not
persuaded that it would be desirable, even if it is legitimate, for the Court to attempt to persuade
the country to abandon the general expectation that the Court sits in constitutional cases to say
what the law is. Cf. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1991)
(discussing circumstances in which it is legitimate for a common law court to lead rather than
follow social expectations about conduct).
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a justice, to what sources, and with what modes of thought and
consideration, are you to decide what is “best”? Does best mean most just
and, if so, under whose views of morality? Does best mean most politically
desirable? But then, intelligent people often disagree fundamentally over
what that is. Most economically efficient? But even if we can get the
economists to agree on an answer, economics does not answer the question
of which goals we want to reach most efficiently unless it becomes, overtly
or by slight-of-hand, another (contestable) moral or political position. Best
pragmatically? But that is even less than no answer, since it has no content
at all. 35
The historical King James did not confront this problem with any
“natural reason” argument, at least in (his) theory, since he was the monarch
and could determine for himself both what kind of considerations count in
figuring out what is best for society and also how to know when one has
chosen rightly among the relevant considerations. 36 A twenty-first century
American justice is not a monarch, and enjoys no such privileges. The
justices are, and in any realistically imaginable world they will continue to
be, sharply divided on hugely important issues of political and social policy,
morality, economics, and the most suitable way to understand the
relationship among all of these factors.37 This is neither unique to the Court
nor a fault: fundamental disagreement over moral, political, and economic
issues is one of the moral circumstances of any modern, complex society. 38
As a society, the United States is riven with disagreement over all of these
issues, and the Court’s divisions only mirror this fact. If per impossibile the
justices achieved agreement on which metric to use across the board in
35. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 64–65 (“In law and morals, particularly, the admonition to
avoid thorny questions by seeing ‘what works’ is not just unhelpful. It is unintelligible.”).
36. The conflict between the King and the common lawyers represented by Coke was, of
course, in part a cultural one in which the Scottish James held views of the monarch’s role that
Coke and many of his other English subjects rejected in theory. The historical results of James’s
son and successor Charles’s attempts to push James’s constitutional views even further provide an
interesting commentary on the relationship between theory and practice in constitutionalism. See
generally RICHARD CUST, CHARLES I: A POLITICAL LIFE (2007) (discussing relationship between
Charles’s political and constitutional views and the cases of the English Civil War).
37. I assume, with considerable though not perfect confidence, that American politics is
unlikely to generate a situation in which a president is able to make over the entire Court in his or
her desired image. Even if that were to happen, history strongly suggests that the result would not
be to create a lasting intellectual consensus on the Court, but only to shift the lines of
disagreement. The Stone Court, the only modern example of a Court reconstituted by a single
president, was notoriously contentious. Neither President Nixon’s four appointees nor the five
chosen by Presidents Reagan and Bush managed to cohere sufficiently to eliminate sharp divisions
among themselves or on the Court as a whole.
38. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 33 (2001) (“[W]e assume the
fact of reasonable pluralism to be a permanent condition of a democratic society.”). Rawls did not
actually intend to limit the assertion to democracies as a descriptive matter. His point was that
what he called a democratic society ought to accept such disagreements rather than attempt to
eliminate them.
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determining the “best” outcomes in constitutional cases, they would be
establishing, in effect, an orthodoxy of value in American public life that
would be neither consistent with our constitutional tradition nor reflective
of contemporary American society. 39
At least in the absence of a successful totalitarianism that all would
agree is not acceptable under the Constitution, American government does
rely on general agreement about certain moral commitments, for example,
that it is morally and politically unacceptable for someone entrusted with
public authority intentionally to misuse that authority. 40 Beyond these
general agreements, however, the Constitution, as Justice Holmes wrote
long ago, “is made for people of fundamentally differing views,” 41 and a
primary social function of federal constitutional law is to provide a shared
means of addressing fundamental disagreements when those cannot be
avoided or resolved through the majoritarian political process. “Alongside
conflicting moral traditions within a single society there can at the same
time be a shared political culture within shared institutions.”42 “The
institutions and their rituals hold society together, insofar as they are
successful and well established in the resolution of moral and political
conflicts according to particular local and national conventions: ‘this is our
peculiar form of governance and we cling to it.’” 43 As the philosopher
Stuart Hampshire has argued persuasively, such institutions and their modes
of dispute resolution can play this role only insofar they can draw on, and
themselves embody, “respect for locally established and familiar rules of
procedure.” 44
In the United States, the Supreme Court has proven able to serve as
“both the setting and the mechanism of the conflict resolution” over “very
bitter conflicts of moral principle” only because “[t]he Court and its
procedures have in fact acquired authority and have established a tradition
of respect among bitter adversaries contesting substantive issues of
justice.” 45 The basically common-law forms of legal argument and legal
decision that Americans inherited from England are among the particular
conventions or procedures that, through their perceived success and
undeniable longevity, have given the Court the deep reservoirs of public
respect that enable it to exercise authority even in the teeth of profound

39. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”).
40. On this essential, but exceedingly thin and mostly procedural morality, see generally
STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000).
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
42. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 40, at 44–45.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. at 95.
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disagreement with individual decisions on the part of many Americans. If
this “respect for custom breaks down and ceases to operate, we should
expect catastrophe.” 46
The Supreme Court is an agency of government and its members have,
from any reasonable perspective, a presumptive obligation to preserve its
efficacy in the system of government, not just out of institutional selfinterest, but as a corollary of their duty to act in accordance with their
offices. A declared intent on the part of the justices to decide cases not on
the basis of the legal tradition with its general, long-standing social
acceptance, but through the invocation of particular moral, political, or
economic commitments that many Americans reject, might well destroy the
Court’s social value as a setting and a mechanism of dispute resolution.
(c) The problem with the originalist version of the critique that sparked
originalism.
Some readers, I expect, find it a curious feature of both my lecture and
this essay that, in describing the problem that sparked originalism and that
fuels much of its ongoing appeal, I have invoked lawyers who would not
describe themselves as originalists—Bickel, Ely, Fried—rather than the
founding fathers of originalism, figures such Edwin Meese, Robert Bork,
and Raoul Berger. To some extent, this reflects a substantive judgment
about the quality of constitutional argument presented by the particular
lawyers on these two short lists, 47 but the more important reason is that
originalism itself suffers from a serious internal flaw that ultimately makes
originalists less than ideal proponents of their own critique.
As I have argued, the justification for the attack the first originalists
advanced against the constitutional work of the Supreme Court of the 1960s
and ‘70s, that it was all too often professionally deficient, necessarily rests
on the existence of a standard of professionalism that the Court itself ought
to have recognized. Unfortunately, in offering their solution for the Court’s
deficiencies, the early originalists abandoned the allegiance to traditional
legal method that provided the basis for their critique: instead of recalling
the justices to the duty to do law, traditionally understood, in deciding

46. Id. at 98.
47. Fried is, and Bickel and Ely were, outstanding figures in the intellectual history of
constitutional scholarship. In contrast, Attorney General Meese’s role in the story was, of course,
political rather than intellectual, and Berger, whom I believe to have been a very smart lawyer in
practice, was intellectually unsuited to the scholarly tasks he undertook. For substantiation of this
unfortunately harsh evaluation, see Hans W. Baade, “Original Intention:” Raoul Berger's Fake
Antique, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1523 (1992). Judge Bork is, of course, a distinguished antitrust scholar,
but his scholarly writing on constitutional law has been more limited, and his most important and
interesting constitutional opinion as a judge was thoroughly traditional in its reasoning. See
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993–1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, Cir. J., concurring),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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constitutional cases, they asserted that the justices should adopt a
substantively novel approach to decision making that would have replaced
legal reasoning with a blend of historical research and textual analysis.
Of course, the first originalists never put it quite that way but generally
claimed that “original intent” argument, in their sense, was the traditional
mode of constitutional interpretation, but for anyone unconvinced by this
historical claim about the forms of constitutional-law argument, originalism
is a critique without a firm basis in any proposition that the justices being
criticized had any reason to accept as legitimate. Since I am among the
unconvinced on the historical claim, I think originalism fails to provide a
sound basis on which to ground the originalists’ criticism of the Court that I
largely share. One cannot convincingly indict the justices for a failure to
observe traditional standards of legal decision while rejecting those very
standards oneself. 48
(2) Objection: Judicial review on any basis other than originalism
cannot avoid, in either theory or practice, lapsing into the illegitimate
substitution of judicial policy preferences for those of the legislature (or
executive), and thus one ought to be an originalist. My response is that
originalists do not agree on what approach to use, all versions of
originalism are novel and untested, and the originalist search for a
theory-based constraint on judicial waywardness is fatally flawed.
In his remarks, Professor Paulsen noted the very substantial overlap
between the concerns motivating originalists like himself and my insistence
that the judiciary’s lawful authority to overturn political-branch decisions
for constitutional reasons exists only insofar as the judiciary acts in
accordance with law rather than as a political actor parallel to the legislature
or executive. Since, as he sees it, originalism alone provides a non-political
48. Judge Bork was well aware of the historical complications with a history-based
justification for originalism, see, for example, his attack on Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), as
an example of the Court violating the principles that ought to govern judicial review in ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 19–20, 31–32
(1990). He put the case for both the critique and the proposed originalist solution primarily on the
ground that originalism would serve the principle of respect for democratic decision by the selfimposition of judicial restraint. Bork’s concern with the problem of reconciling judicial review
and democracy long predated his embrace of originalism, see Robert H. Bork, The Supreme Court
Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 138 (“What, after all, justifies a non-elected
committee of lawyers in overriding the policies of the elected representatives of the people?”), and
probably owed a great deal to his close association with Bickel, whose views on constitutional
interpretation were not static but were not primarily concerned with originalist-style arguments,
see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
This is a far more tenable justification for originalism in my judgment but one that fails in the end
to respond to the counter-criticism that it provides no non-arbitrary baseline for determining when
a judicial decision invalidating a statute is restrained and respectful of democracy. In practice, it
would lead to the virtual elimination of judicial review altogether.
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method for setting legal constraints on political-branch actions, my own
premises require me to adopt originalism.
One approach to making this argument is conceptual: (a) all legal
interpretation of an authoritative text is originalist, because that is what it
means to interpret a text, and, therefore, (b) constitutional law must be
originalist because constitutional law is, by universal concession, the
interpretation of an authoritative text. Unfortunately, this argument runs
into difficulties at the very beginning, with its definition of interpreting a
text. Leave to one side sophistications such as reader-response theory that
ascribe to the reader (complete?) freedom to make up meaning and ascribe
it to the document being “interpreted,” and grant the assumption that the
meaning of an historical document must be tied in some sense to the past in
which it was created: 49 where do we go from there?
In my lecture, I expressly declined to get involved in the internecine
conflicts among originalists over how to do originalist interpretation, but
the existence and nature of those conflicts are directly relevant to the claim
that only originalism can serve as a properly legal mode of interpreting the
Constitution, for the originalists do not agree, and often reject, one
another’s interpretive methods with almost as much vigor as they criticize
the justices. Professor Paulsen, for example, insists that “no ‘normative’
argument is necessary to justify original-public-meaning textualism as the
sole, legitimate, correct method of constitutional interpretation. . . . If what
one is doing is ‘constitutional interpretation,’ original-meaning textualism is
the only enterprise consistent with that description.” 50 On the other hand,
Professor Walter Benn Michaels assures us that “you can’t (coherently and
non-arbitrarily) think of yourself as still doing textual interpretation as soon
as you appeal to something beyond authorial intention – for example, the
original public meaning.” 51 Michaels is no doubt in the grip of “the
originalist-intentionalist fallacy” in Paulsen’s view, while Michaels thinks
an original public meaning approach like Paulsen’s is no more an
interpretation of the text than an overtly non-originalist one. 52 And so it
49. An assumption I happily make. See H. Jefferson Powell, Grand Visions in an Age of
Conflict, 115 YALE L.J. 2067, 2072 n. 15 (2006) (“the existence of a written Constitution
necessarily makes a moderate originalism an indispensable starting point for anything that can
plausibly claim to be American constitutional law: A refusal to use original meaning to establish
the starting point for the words the document uses would render the text infinitely manipulable.”).
50. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 918 (2009).
51. Walter Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 21, 21
(2009).
52. Compare Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003), and especially id. at 1141 n.96
(“crude intentionalism”) and id. at 1145 n.114 (intentionalism as a “fallacy”) with Michaels, supra
note 50, at 35 (original public meaning approach is “not a kind of textualism [and] it is not a kind
of originalism either. . . . So we cannot really prefer [original public meaning] to non-originalism
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goes, leaving even a willing convert to originalism wondering where to
turn.
The problem, of course, is not simply that there are too many flavors of
originalism to choose among. More fundamentally, the disputes among
originalists demonstrate the fact that there is no basis in existing
constitutional practice, or in assumptions generally shared among
constitutionalists, that grounds the argument for any particular species of
originalism as over against the rest. Those of us who defend traditional
legal reasoning as the proper approach to constitutional decision have just
such a basis: as Professor Fried has written, from the founding era on
American lawyers have “taken for granted that the Constitution, like other
legal texts, would be interpreted by men who were learned in the law,
arguing cases and writing judgments in the way lawyers and judges had
done for centuries in England and its colonies.” As it has actually been
practiced, constitutional law has always displayed “the texture of common
lawyers’ reasoning,” and this fact about the practice puts the onus on those
who would change it. 53
In contrast, an originalist must argue for whichever version of
originalism she advocates from the ground up, and against not only Fried’s
and my invocation of the “normative power of the actual” but also the
critical claim of other originalists that his argument rests on fallacy or faux
originalism. In practice, originalist arguments regularly depend on claims
about the definition of their terms, which invites the response that
definitional assertions have no persuasive power on their own: they gain
purchase on the mind only if one has some good reason to accept the
definition being proffered other than the reiteration in a louder voice of the
circular or lexicographic claim that X is Y. Smart originalists like
Professors Paulsen and Michaels know as much and offer reasons
supporting their definitions, 54 but those reasons too are contested and
contestable. Originalism, which bids for our acceptance with the promise of
rescuing constitutional law from the grip of willful choice, ends up
presenting us with choices that may not be willful but certainly seem
intractable.
Assume, counterfactually, that we find general agreement on what it
means to interpret an authoritative text, and now turn to the second half of
the conceptual argument, that constitutional law is, by universal concession,
the interpretation of an authoritative text. At first glance, this may sound

on the grounds that it is looking for what the Constitution originally meant; after all, the
hypothetical plain meaner is just hypothetical.”).
53. FRIED, supra note 22, at 66.
54. Respectively, that the Constitution’s text ordains original public meaning interpretation,
and that a resort to authorial intention is necessary even to establish the language and genre of a
document.
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plausible or even obviously correct: after all, it really is agreed on all sides
that the authority of the text of the Constitution is axiomatic. 55
As part of an argument for originalism, however, the statement begs the
question it is meant to answer. The text is indeed authoritative, although not
always in any simple way, 56 but what the Court and other constitutional
decision makers have been doing for the past two centuries has never been
limited to textual arguments in any narrow sense, whether based on the
dictionary or (in originalist fashion) on original public meaning, original
understanding, or makers’ intentions. The actual practice of constitutional
law has always involved textual argument—and, for that matter,
invocations of original meaning—but, just as invariably, it has included
other modalities of argument as well. 57 Even if one agrees that those other
modalities of constitutional argument ought not to be termed
“interpretations” of the constitutional text, they have still been, as a
descriptive matter, part of the discourse that everyone has been calling
constitutional law.
It is, of course, entirely legitimate for an originalist to argue that such
arguments are constitutionally illegitimate and that the lawyers and judges
have been wrong to use them, that they make bad constitutional law. But it
makes very little sense to say that x is not part of a social practice when the
central participants in that practice have been doing x for over two hundred
years, saying all the while that they were engaged in the practice. As I
argued in my lecture, the originalist argument that constitutional law should
become a narrower practice than it has been is an argument for quite radical
change. Originalism is, in fact, a bid to change the definition of
constitutional law, and as such it can gain no support from the sort of
conceptual argument originalists so often deploy.
This leaves the argument that in hard fact originalism is the only
realistic method available to constrain the ability of judges—but here we
really mean the justices of the Supreme Court since lower-court judges act
subject to reversal—to do whatever they want in the name of the
55. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383–
84 (1981) (“The authoritative status of the written constitution is . . . an incontestable first
principle . . . not in need of further demonstration.”).
56. Consider the double jeopardy clause’s application to criminal prosecutions in which
neither life nor limb is at risk, or the very substantial disconnect between the text of the Eleventh
Amendment and the constitutional law of state sovereign immunity from federal-law actions in
federal and state courts.
57. Cf. L.H. LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 373,
399–400 (1987) (“Law is a particular way of using texts and precedents, and there are many ways
of using these tools. It is an empirical rather than a theoretical question as to which techniques of
using precedent prevail in any particular historical context. In some contexts, lawyers and judges
use texts to generate rules. In other historical contexts, the practice of using texts and precedents
yields a process of practical judgments about what is good for social well-being. The
determination of which practice actually occurs is a question for historical investigation.”).
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Constitution. Originalism may be, at best, a “lesser evil,” as Justice Scalia
famously termed it, but it is a lesser evil than rule by an imperial judiciary
imposing its will by fiat. By insisting that the justices limit their exercise of
the power of judicial review to cases in which originalist arguments justify
such a decision, the argument goes, we can cabin the Court’s discretion and
avoid a repetition of the excesses of the Warren and Burger eras.
Originalism is, then, to be adopted for instrumental reasons, as a tool, a
means of insuring that judicial review remains “law,” decision constrained
by authority, and not “politics,” the willful imposition of policy preferences.
The concern to preserve the character of constitutional decision as a
practice quite distinct from the policy-driven activities of the political
branches of government is, I think, crucially important to the American
system—here, once more, I part company with the anti-originalists who
dismiss as entirely unfounded originalism’s uneasy view of the Court’s
constitutional cases, although, in my view, the grounds for discomfort did
not magically depart the Court when Chief Justice Burger retired. They
may, in fact, be increasing. 58 But originalism, in this instance, offers neither
a workable solution nor even an accurate diagnosis.
As I argued in my lecture, originalism proposes a thoroughgoing
revision of the processes of argument and reasoning that lawyers and judges
employ in constitutional cases, away from traditional legal method (which
has included arguments based on original history) to a narrow focus on the
results of historical investigation. I will not repeat most of my objections on
that score here. I believe, however, that I failed to state adequately the
problem with originalism’s diagnosis, which sees in traditional legal
reasoning an inadequate constraint on judicial willfulness. To frame the
issue in that manner is to begin with an error, for the issue is not one of
constraint at all in the sense the diagnosis presupposes.
A judge bent on manipulating the intellectual tools allowed to reach
conclusions he or she does not actually think justified by those tools can,
and no doubt will, do so whether the tools include all those in the traditional
lawyer’s toolkit or only the narrower and more exotic ones available to the
originalist. As a practical matter, trying to control judicial misbehavior by
tinkering with the forms of argument is useless. Worse, it mistakes the real
and greatly valuable point of theoretical reflection on constitutional
decision, which is to enable the decision maker acting in good faith to do
her job better, more in accord with the societal understanding of her office
and its duties. Legal method is a description of how to do law that
presupposes an intention to act in good faith, somewhat as the scientific

58. See H. Jefferson Powell, Footnote 27: Reasoning About the Irrational in Constitutional
Law (May 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing the implications of
the Court’s reasoning in two recent cases).
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method is a description of how to do science rather than a (vain) attempt to
stop dishonest experimenters from falsifying their data.
In the end, the most serious flaw in the originalist diagnosis is its
implicit dualism, the underlying intellectual Manichaeanism that leads
originalists to try to create a cordon sanitaire between constitutional law
and politics understood broadly. It is a mere assumption, not a truth woven
into the fabric of the social universe, that decision makers can act in
accordance with law only if we find some way to cleanse both decision and
decision maker of any concern with the normative considerations that lie at
the heart of politics. 59 Any attempt to do so will fail—Chief Justice
Marshall was right to insist that judgments on difficult constitutional
matters are inevitably influenced “by the wishes, the affections, and the
general theories” of even the most conscientious constitutionalist—and it is
wrong-headed in principle even to try.
The American founders, as Professor Bobbitt wrote, “introduced the
modalities of legal argument into the politics of the state.” Two centuries of
experience have shown that decision to be a success, overall and despite all
the failures, some of which have been tragic and very serious indeed.60
Constitutional law has afforded the Republic a social mechanism for
making responsible decisions in the resolution of disputes under conditions
of great political, moral, and economic disagreement, and for doing so
without ignoring the presence of those disagreements. Originalism, with its
underlying dichotomy between law and politics and, for that matter, the
anti-originalism of the “law is politics” school of thought, obscure this
accomplishment. As Professor Ralf Michaels has put it:
The advantage of law-talk over history-talk is . . . that it transcends
the politics/formalism divide in a fruitful matter. . . . [T]he
attractiveness of the law is that it has developed a technical
language to deal with the political without making it disappear: we
do not need to deny the politics of decisionmaking and can still
make decisions. 61
59. Despite the genuine respect for democracy that motivates many originalists, I believe that
originalism’s attempt to divorce constitutional law from politics has extremely negative
implications for political-branch behavior. If the constitutional law-jobs which judges and lawyers
execute need to exclude politics in the way that originalism assumes, it is easy to assume that
those whose job is to do politics have no role or responsibility in the implementation of
constitutional norms—the latter task is, after all, a law-job and thus apolitical! The theoretical and
practical problems with accepting the sort of dichotomy between law and politics that originalism
promotes are profound, but go beyond the scope of this essay. See Powell, supra note 58.
60. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 200 (2002) (discussing
the Korematsu case as showing “the potential” within the American constitutional system “for
procedural and substantive regularity to coexist with, and even to validate injustice”).
61. E-mail from Ralf Michaels, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, to H.
Jefferson Powell, Frederic Cleaveland Professor of Law and Divinity, Duke University School of
Law (on file with author).
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Constitutional law cannot address all of society’s concerns, and as thenJustice Stone once wrote, “[c]ourts are not the only agency of government
that must be assumed to have capacity to govern.” 62 The law and the Court
are limited in their efficacy and competence, and there is ample reason to
fear that in recent years the Court has taken too little note of those limits.
But it is equally important not to mistake or underestimate the real
achievements of our constitutional tradition and thereby to endanger what is
for all its flaws a vital part of the ongoing American experiment in making
governmental authority worthy of respect, and governmental power an
instrument of human good.

62. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).

